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HAS THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
TO DECLARE VOID AN ACT OF
CONGRESS?
The question whether the Supreme Court of the United
States has the legal authority to pronounce an act of Congress unconstitutional and void, was, early in the present
century, answered by that distinguished tribunal in the affirmative. After the lapse of nearly a century, it may be
worth while to enquire whether there are not considerations that justify a reconsideration of the question.
Among these considerations we venture to suggest the following:
An act of Congress becomes such only after it has passed
both houses, and received the approval of the President,
or if the latter does not return it, with his approval or disapproval, within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it has
been presented to him, it becomes law in like manner as if
he had signed it. Thus each house, in the passage of a law,
has a veto upon the other, and the President upon both. The
House, and the Senate, and the President, all of whom are
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sworn to support the Constitution, haying reached a common conclusion, and concurred in the passage of a law, in
what clause of the Constitution is the Supreme Court empowered to interpose a judicial veto upon their legislation?
Where, in the Constitution, is the judicial power associated
with the legislative power, and vested with the final veto?
When an act has been passed in the constitutional mode,
it should seem, in the absence of express authority, to be
beyond the power of the judicial branch of the government
to nullify it. The judiciary, it should equally seem, is
bound to assume that the Legislature, in passing laws has
obeyed the Constitution, and that its legislation is in accord
therewith.
Otherwise, if the Supreme Court has a veto upon acts
of Congress, and can nullify them whenever a case involving them is brought before the court, then, in the words of
Mr. Lincoln, in his first Inaugural Message, "the candid
citizen must confess that if the policy of the government
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties
in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their
own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, decided
in 1803 (I. Cranch 137), puts, in the Socratic method,
the contrary view thus: "If an act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its
invalidity, bind the courts,. and oblige them to give it effect?" He holds that it does not. The fallacy involved in
the question, however, is, in the assumption that the act of
the Legislature in question, is repugnant to the Constitution.
On the contrary, in the opinion of both houses of Congress,
and in the opinion of the President, it is in accord with, and
in pursuance of, the Constitution.
The courts are not required, after the law-making power
has spoken, to close their eyes on the Constitution, and see
only the law, as the illustrious chief justice, in another
part of his opinion, suggests, but they are to consider that
the lawmakers have eyes as well as the judges, and have
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used them, and that when a law comes before the court,
it comes for construction and enforcement, not for the purpose of putting the opinions of judges against the opinions
of legislators, as to its constitutionality; and if they are in
conflict, to disregard the latter, and to give force and effect to the former. Is the opinion of nine men, composing
the Supreme Court, or the opinion of a majority of the
nine, infallible? Does the bench act under the impress of
greater wisdom, or under a higher sanction than does the
Legislature?
No doubt, an act of Congress, which should declare that
in treason the testimony of one witness was sufficient to convict, when the Constitution expressly declares that there
shall be no conviction unless upon the testimony of two,
would not be binding on the courts. An act of that character
the courts might disregard, and would have direct authority
for so doing in the Constitution itself. For in the few instances of express provisions, like the instance we have cited
where the Constitution requires the testimony of two witnesses to convict, in a trial for treason, the judiciary is the
immediate department of the government to carry such provisions into effect. In those instances, "the language of the
Constitution," to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall
himself, "is addressed especially to the courts."
Confessedly, one of the ablest jurists that Pennsylvania
has produced, was the late Chief Justice Gibson. He denied
the right of the judiciary to pass upon the constitutionality
of a Legislative Act, and to declare it void, upon the ground
of repugnance. In the case of Eakin v. Raub (decided in
1824), 12 Sergeant & Rawle, 330, being then a justice of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, he said, in delivering
his opinion, "that it is not a little remarkable, that although
the right in question has all along been claimed by the
judiciary, no judge has ventured to discuss it, except Chief
Justice Marshall (in Marbury v. Madison), and if the argument of a jurist so distinguished for the strength of his
ratiocinative powers be found inconclusive, it may fairly
be set down to the weakness of the position which he attempts to defend."
With this preliminary observation, Mr. Justice Gibson
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proceeds to examine the question, on the principles of the
Constitution, and he reaches the conclusion that "it is the
business of the judiciary to interpret the laws, not scan the
authority of the lawgiver; and without the latter it cannot
take cognizance of a collision between a law and the Constitution. .
.
It will not be pretended, that the Legislature has not at least an equal right with the judiciary to
put a construction on the Constitution; nor that either of
them is infallible; nor that either ought to be required to
surrender its judgment to the other. Suppose, then, they
differ in opinion as to the constitutionality of a particular
law: if the organ whose business it first is to decide on the
subject, is not to have its judgment treated with respect,
what shall- prevent it from securing the preponderance of its
opinion by the strong arm of power? .
.
I take it,
then, the Legislature is entitled to all the deference that is
due to the judiciary; that its acts are in no case to be treated
as ipso facto void, except where they would produce a revolution in the government; and that, to avoid them, requires
the act of some tribunal competent under the Constitution
(if any such there be), to pass on their validity."
He concludes that the people, in the exercise of the elective franchise, constitute that tribunal. "I am of opinion,"
he says, "that it rests with the people, in whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by instructing their representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary power in the
government, is reserved by the people for their own immediate use; and to redress an infringement of their rights
in this respect, would seem to be an accessory of the power
thus reserved. It might, perhaps, have been better to vest
the power in the judiciary; as it might be expected that its
habits of deliberation, and the aid derived from the arguments of counsel, would more frequently lead to accurate
conclusions. On the other hand, the judiciary is not infallible: and an error by it would admit of no remedy, but
a more distinct expression of the public will, through the
extraordinary medium of a convention; whereas an error
by the Legislature admits of a remedy by an exertion of
the same will, in the ordinary exercise of the right of suf-
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frage-a mode better calculated to attain the end, without
popular excitement."
But it is said that the judges are sworn to support the
Constitution. So are the legislators. And is it meant that
more respect is to be paid to the oaths of the judges than
to the oaths of the legislators, or that the oath enlarges the
scope of legislative power?
"What I have in view in this inquiry," said Mr.
Justice Gibson in Eakin v. Raub, "is the supposed right of
the judiciary to interfere in cases where the Constitution is
to be carried into effect through the instrumentality of
the Legislature, and where that organ must necessarily first
decide on the constitutionality of its own act. The oath to
support the Constitution is not peculiar to the judges, but
is taken indiscriminately by every officer of the government, and is designed rather as a test of the political principles of the man, than to bind the officer in the discharge
of his duty .
.
But granting it to relate to the official conduct of the judge, as well as every other officer,
and not to his political principles, still it must be understood
in reference to supporting the Constitution, only as far as
that may be involved in his official duty; and, consequently,
if his official duty does not comprehend an inquiry into the
authority of the Legislature, neither does his oath. It is
worthy of remark here, that the foundation of every argu-.
ment in favor of the right of the judiciary, is found at last
to be an assumption of the whole ground of dispute.
. . . The oath was more probably designed to secure
the powers of each of the different branches from being
usurped by any of the rest; for instance, to prevent the
House of Representatives from enacting itself into a Court
of Judicature, or the Supreme Court from attempting to
control the Legislature."
If "the policy of the government upon vital questions"
can be brought to naught by the interposition of the judiciary; if its legislative authority, after being duly exercised,
perhaps, too, in time of war, when its armies are on the
march, and its resources are all needed to support its warlike measures can be challenged and set aside by the decision of a court, in a personal action between John Doe
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and Richard Roe, then, the gravest disasters may occur,
and the stability of the national edifice may be put in the
gravest peril. Can we enter upon a foreign war, for example; can we acquire foreign possessions, as we seem
inclined to do, and adopt measures for their government,
when the success of these operations, civil and military,
may be thwarted by a judicial decision in favor of Richard
Roe, upon a question of taxes, for instance,--the decision
being based upon the unconstitutionality of an act of
Congress in the premises! In view of such contingencies,
may not the time have arrived when the powers of the Supreme Court should be carefully re-examined, and, if found
necessary, be more strictly defined by a Constitutional
amendment?
Even those who assert the power of the courts-Federal
and State--"to scan the authority of the lawgiver" must
admit that the frequency with which it is exercised has become matter for serious reflection, and grave concern.
The late venerable Chief Justice Tilghman, who agreed with
the doctrine declared in Marbury v. Madison, nevertheless
in Eakin v. Raub, delivered this admonition, namely, that
"the utmost deference is due to the opinion, of the Legislature-so great, indeed, that a judge would be unpardonable, who, in a doubtful case should declare a law to be
void."
Instead of this deference on the part of the courts, how
often do we find them exhibiting the refinements of metaphysical reasoning to discover a discrepancy between the
law and the Constitution, and, after all, the result only disclosing "a doubtful case" where the law'should have been
-upheld, but, nevertheless, was declared void. In view of
this judicial trend, we repeat, may not the time have arrived,
when the public interests require an assurance, in constitutional form, that the courts, whether Federal or State, "can
exercise no power of supervision over the Legislature, without producing a direct authority for it in the Constitution,"
Federal or State respectively?
Henry Flanders.

